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PEOPLE v. BROWN [55 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 6655. In Bank. Dec. 22, 1960.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOSEPH BROWN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Poisons-Offenses-Oonstrnction of Statute.-An interpreta-
tion of an existing statute by the Subcommittee on Narcotics 
of the Assembly Interim Committee of the Judiciary, such as 
that Health & Saf. Code, § 11501, would not encompass an 
offer to sell a narcotic and subsequent failure to deliver any-
thing, which proposed § 11&Q9 (which was not enacted) en-
visaged, is not conclusive. 
[2] Id.-Offenses-IDegal Offer to Sell Narcotics.-A specific in-
tent to sell a narcotic is an essential element of the crime of 
offering to make such a sale under Health &'Saf. Code, § 11501. 
[8] Id.-Offenses-IDegal Offer to Sell Narcotics-'Evidence.-In a 
prosecution for illegally offering to sell narcotics, in view of 
defendant's admission that "he had [the stuff] and he was on 
his way back but the police rousted him and he had to get 
rid of it," and the absence of any compelling evidence that 
defendant's offer was false, the trial court could reasonably 
conclude that defendant meant what he said when he had 
stated to the same undercover officer that for $9.00 "he would 
get it for me. . .. He would get the stuff for me." 
[4] Id.-Offenses-IDegal Offer to Sell Narcotics.-There is noth-
ing in Health & Saf. Code, § 11501, to support a contention 
that an offer to sell narcotics means an attempt to sell, since 
it proscribes both "offers to transport, import into this State, 
sell, furnish, administer or give away" and "attempts to import 
into this State or transport any narcotic." By thus distinguish-
ing between offers and attempts the Legislature made clear 
that the requirement of a direct, unequivocal act toward • 
sale necessary for an attempt to make a sale is not an implied 
element of an offer to sell. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a 'new trial. 
William E. Fox, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for an illegal offer to sell narcotics. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 28 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Poisons, § 9; [2, 4] Poisons, § 10.1; 
[3] Poisons, § 15. 
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tor Appellant. 
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THE COURT .-The trial court, sitting without a jury, 
found defendant guilty of offering to sell narcotics in violation 
of section 11500 (now, renumbered and hereafter called 
§ 11501) of the Health and Safety Code. It also found that 
he was previously convicted of attempted robbery, denied 
his motion for new trial, and sentenced him to imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary for the term prescribed by law. 
Defendant appeals. 
The public defender represented defendant at the trial, but 
. did not undertake to do so on appeal. (See Gov. Code, § 27706.) 
Defendant requested the District Court of Appeal, Second 
District, Division Three, in which the appeal was pending, to 
appoint an attorney to represent him, claiming that he was 
without funds to employ counsel. The court made an inde-
pendent investigation of the record, determined that repre-
sentation by counsel would be of no benefit to defendant or 
to the court, and denied the request. (See People v. Hyde, 
51 Cal.2d 152, 154 [331 P.2d 42].) Defendant prepared and 
filed a brief in propria persona. The court affirmed the judg-
ment. (People v. Brown, (Cal.App.) 3 Cal.Rptr. 203.) We 
granted defendant's petition for hearing in this court and 
appointed counsel to represent him. 
Officer Walton, an "l1ndercover narcotics agent, had arranged 
to buy heroin from an unidentified person and was awaiting 
delivery when defendant walked up to him and asked if he 
were a policeman. He replied that he was not. When defend-
ant then asked him what he was waiting for, he replied that 
he was expecting a delivery of heroin. Defendant then left. 
While sitting in a bar the following afternoon, Officer 
Walton saw defendant on the street and called to him, and 
defendant entered the bar. Officer Walton testified: "I told 
him that I would like to know who put the jacket on me, mean-
ing who said that I was a policeman; and the defendant stated 
that he couldn't tell me that, but that he didn't think I was a 
policeman because I didn't look the type and I told him that I 
wanted to get some stuff, meaning heroin; and he stated that 
he could get it for me but if I turned him in, well, the people 
around that area would know who burned him-meaning had 
55 C.2d-3 
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him arrested. " Officer Walton told defendant that he did not 
want to get burned again, meaning that he did not want to 
part with his money without receiving narcotics in return. 
Defendant answered that if Officer Walton wanted "it," he 
would have to take some risks. Officer Walton then gave de-. 
fendant $9.00 and defendant left. Officer Walton waited for 
some time, but defendant did not return. 
He saw defendant again three or four days later and asked. 
him why he had not returned to the bar. Defendant answered: 
"that he had it and he was on his way back but the police. 
rousted him and he had to get rid of it. " He again encountered 
defendant about a week and a half later and called to him 
"[t]hat was a pretty dirty deal you pulled on me the other; 
day." Defendant replied that he would speak to him later.: 
He did not see defendant again imtil his arrest. Defendant 
did not deliver heroin or any other substance to Officer Walton 
in return for the $9.00. , 
In his briefs filed in the District Court of Appeal, defend-: 
ant contends that a specific intent to sell narcotics is an essen- : 
tial element of the crime of offering to sell narcotics under 
section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code l and that this 
intent cannot be inferred from the making of the offer alone. 
He asserts that the making of such an offer is equally attribut-
able to an intent to obtain money by false pretenses. His 
counsel makes the additional contention that by proscribing 
offers to sell the Legislature in effect proscribed one form of 
attempts to sell and that therefore we must look to the law 
of attempts to determine whether an oral offer to sell consti-
tutes an attempt to sell. He asserts that the oral offer and the 
taking of the money were only preparation to making a sale 
1Section 11501 provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this divi· 
sion, every person who transports, imports into this State, sells, furnishes, 
administers or gives away, or offers to transport, import into this Sta~. 
sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or attempts to import into tbll 
State or transport any narcotic other than marijuana except upon ~e 
written prescription of a physician, dentist, chiropodist, or veterinariBl1 
licensed t.o practice in this St.ate shall be punished by imprisonment ill 
the county jail for not. more than one year, or in the state prison from 
five years to life. 
. •• If such a person has been previously convicted of any offense a~· 
scribed in this division or has been previously convicted of aI\Y offen,", 
under the la.ws of any other state or of the United States which if ~:d 
mitted in this State would have been punishable as an offense des. en . 
in this division, the previous conviction shall be charged in the ln~let. 
ment or information and if found to be true by the jury, upon a .Jury 
trial, or if found to be true by the court, upon a court tria.l, o~ II 
admitted by the defendant, he shall be imprisoned in the state pruOll . 
from 10 years to life." 
) 
\'b~ 
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and that neither was a direct, unequivocal act toward a sale. 
(See People v. Gallardo, 41 Ca1.2d 57, 66 [257 P.2d 29], antI 
eases cited.) Since in his view such an act is an essential 
element of the corpus delicti of an offer to sell within the 
meaning of section 11501, it cannot be proYed by defendant's 
extrajudicial admi!'sioll standing alone that "he had it and 
he was on his way back but the police rousted him and he had 
to get rid of it." (See People v. Duncan, 51 Ca1.2d 523, 528 
[334 P.2d 858]; People v. McMonl~(Jle, 29 Ca1.2d 730, 738 
[177 P.2d 745].) 
Both defendant's and his counsel's contentions are con-
sistent with the position taken by the Subcommittee on Nar-
cotics of the Assembly Interim Committee of the Judiciary in 
1953 when it proposed the adoption of two new sections of 
the Health and Safety Code, only one of "'hich was enacted. 
Section 11503 makes it a crime to offer to sell a narcotic and 
then deliver a substitute.2 Proposed section 11509 (§ 10 of 
Assembly Bill No. 2243, 1953 Session) would have made it a 
crime to offer to sell a narcotic coupled with the acceptance of 
money, even though there "'as no delivery of anything.3 
In recommcndillg the passage of section 11503, the sub-
committee stated: "[This section] will be entirely Hew law. 
This will cover the individual who agrees to sell, furnish, 
transport, or give away any narcotic, and then delivers some 
other liquid, substance, or material. These individuals are 
known to be in a position to violate the law; but, for some 
reason, they may feel that thf'Y are dE'aling with a law enforce-
ment officer and thus dE'liver toba('('o, water, or some other 
·Section 11G03 provides that" Every person who agrees, consents, or in 
any manner offers to unlawfully sell. furnish, transport, administer, or 
give any narcotic to allY person, cr offers, arranges, or negotiates to 
hll;ve any narcotic nn1:twflllly sol.l, flp!i\'cn'(l, transported, fllrni~he·l. ail· 
mmistered, or given to any person and tllen sells, delivers, furnishC's, 
transports, administers, or ~iH·s. or niT!:'r", :ur:ll1gcs, or negotiates to hayp 
sold, delivPrpr], transported. furnis!lC'fl. :ldministerp(l, or g;vpn to any 
person :lny otller Jicjllid, slll,st:mcc, or ll1a(l'riul in liell of any l1::tn·oti.· 
shall be 11l1llisllPd hy irnpri';(lI1Il1l'llt in tll(' (,OllIlly jail for not more t11:~n 
one yt'ar, or in tlit' ~1:1t(' prison f01" not IlIOl"(' tllnn 10 yC'ar<;." 
'Proposed sl'ctioll 11.-'(1~. as al1lpl1(lc.1 ~rarcll~, 1~);-':1, read: "]-;n"" 
person who agreps, ("onst'nls, or in any m:ll1ner oITers, to spli, <leli\-,·r. 
furnish, I ransporl, adm in ish'r, or ~i\'e. or arranges or npg'otiatps to 11:1',., 
sold, delivpT!~<l, furni"IIPu, 1 ransportpu, afllJlil1ist(,r,',l, or gin'lI to ally 
person any /1areol i.~ in yiol:i1 iOIl of any provisio/l of tliis di"isioll ano! 
accepts finy money, tllin!! uf Yaltl(', or "fJlf,r ('()Il~i,l('r:tti"n in f1l11 "r 
partial p:lYlllent is guilty of a fpjollY, ~Ind llpon ,~ollvi..tion tll"r('of ~',:JlI 
be confined in t.11c cOl1nty jail for not 1,·"" tkln GO days nor more titan 
one year, or in tile stale prison for not Illore t11:m ;j years." 
) 
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substance with the result that they have had the intent to 
~ommjt the crime but are testing out the officer. At the presrnt 
time nothing can be done to that person, except 10 charge 
[him] with 'bunco.' Under this statute, it provides a penalty 
of not more than one year in the county jailor in the state 
prison for 10 years." The subcommittee thus made clear its 
view that section 11501 did not enrompass all offer to sell a 
nar(·oti~ and subsequrnt drlivcrs 'If a substitute. A fortiori it 
would not encompass an offrr to sell a narcotic and subsequC'nt 
failure 10 delivrr anything, whirh proposed section 11509 
envisaged. 
'Vhe1her the subcommittee's view was based on the theory 
that an offrr alone to sell a narcotic is insufficient evidence 
of a spccifh: in1ellt to make su(·h a sale or on the theory that 
offer means nttempt and that some additional act is required 
10 eonstitute an attempt does not appear. [1] In any event, 
the subl'ommitter's interpretation of the existing statute is 
not eonelu~ive. Even if it is assumed that by enacting section 
11503 the IJegislature impliedly exrluded the conduct therein 
proseribed from the more inc·lusivr language of section 11501~ 
it did not affect the scope of seetion 11501 in relation to de-
fendant's conduct in this case. 
[2] We agree with defendant's contention that a specific 
intent to sen a narcotic is an essential element of the crime 
of offering to makE' such a sale under section 11501. (See Pen. 
CodE', § 20; JJJaftf1' of ¥un Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 514-515 [114 
P. 835, Ann.Cas. 1912C 969] : Peoplf! v. Winston, 46 Cal.2d 
]51, 158 (293 P.2d 40] ; People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 801 
[299 P.2d 850].) [3] In view, however, of defendant's sub-
srquent admission that" he bad [the stuff] and he was on his 
way bark but the police rousted him and he had to get rid 
of it," and the absence of all~' compelling evidence that de-
fE'ndant's offer ,,'as false, the trial court could reasonably con-
('lude that defendant meant what he said when he stated to 
the officer that for $9.00 "he would get it for me .... He would 
grt the stuff for me." [4] Moreover, there is nothing in 
sr(·tion 11501 to support the rontention that an offer to sell 
mr<lns all attrmpt to !'ell, for it pro!'cribes both "offers to trans-
port. import into thi!' State, sell, furnish. administer, or give 
away" and" attempts to import into this State or transport 
any narc-otiC' ... ," By thns distinguishing between offers and 
attempts the Legislature maoe dear that the requirrment of 
a oirect, uneqllivoC'al art to",a1'o a sale neressary for an attempt 
to make a sale is not an jmpljrd element of an offer to sell. 
) 
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The judgllwril alld the order tlcllying the motion for new 
trial are affirmed. 
TRAYNOR,.J. -I concur in the judgment. It is my opinion, 
however, that till' holding in People v. Hyde, 51 Ca1.2d 152, 154 
[331 P.2d 42J, sirould be expanded to require the appoint-
ment of coun!;cl 011 appeal for all indigent defendants convicted 
of felonies. 1 
'The prohlem 11:O~ al tracted nation-wide attention. The subcommittee 
to ::;tudy u.efend!'r ~''ysl{'IllS of the Association of the Dar of the City of 
Xew lork nlHl th.· :\:tlional Legal Aid Association ('oncluacd in their 
report, Equal Juslirt: fOT the Accused 61 (Doubleday, 1959) that " ~i]n 
addition to nffordillg" "arly repr"SE'll1;ltion, any defender system should 
make provision for I h,' ('ontinuan('c of r"l'resentation through appeal in 
approlJriatc cases. /\ II appeal when groumls exist is an inseparalJle part 
of the process th rOIl;.:h which tile iIldividuaJ's guilt or innocence of the 
charges hrougllt :1g-aill,,1 him hy the state L, estabJislled. Counsel is needeu 
to as:;;ist with lh,' tI"("l"lllination of wheth",r an app<'al should he taken 
and, if an appeal i:< laken, to prepare and present it." 
State praC'tice \':1 ri,·:-o. Two states require thl' appointment of counsel 
on appeal in all felollY ,·ases. (Indiana: State ex r{'l. TJThitc Y. Higclmann, 
218 Ind. 57:2. :i7S 1 :\.\ N .1.':.2d 129 j ; Statr: ex rel. Grecco v. Allen Circuit 
Court, 238 Illd. "I I. ;,7;, [1.,3 )..'".E.2d 91-1]; Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. 
~ 957 .:W (3), [if tilt' "fHI rt is satisfied t!lat "review is sought in good faith 
and upon reasonahlo' ~rounds"!.) In ~cw York the appointment of 
counsel on app("al~ til rtIS upon whether the illdigt'llt dL'ft'ndant has a copy 
of tile trinl lllill\lI'·~;. I f he dOC5, no counsel is appointed (People v. 
Breslin, 4 N. '1'.:2.1 7::, suS7 [H!l N.E.:2d S5]); otherwise a! _ .. intment 
is mandatory (1','111,1" v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.::J 278, 280 [140 .:\.E.2d 357]; 
People v. Pit Is, Ii ;-.;. \' .:2d 288, 2G2·:2V3 1160 N.E.2d 5231). Wyoming 
places discretion in lilt' Supreme COllrt to appoint coullsel for indigent 
defendants" in any nilllinal matter or proceeding before said Supreme 
Court." (Wyo. Stals. 1~);37, § 7-~.) SeyC'ral states appoint counsel at the 
trial wllo lias di~H'r('1 iOIl to appeal at puhlic expense. (Connecticut: Sial I.' 
v. Klein, 9;' Conll. ·1:,1, 4ii;3 [112 A. 524] fpublic defC'ndcr]: State Y. 
Zukamkas, 13:2 ('{1Il11. ·(..0, 4..,1-4,,2 note [4;; A.2d 28~11: Iowa: Iowa Code 
Ann. t.it. 36 § 7,:-,.:; (I!I;,U Pocket Part), Tomlinson Y • • \funroc COllnty, 
134 Iowa 60S, (i10 1112 N.W. 1001; :\fichigan: ::-'fi ... h. Stat. Ann. 
~ 28.12;34; MinrH'"ola: l\Iinn. Stat. Ann. ~ Gl1.07(2) (l!};")!) Po('\;:et Part) 
! Reyicw must he Stl 11 g-!. t "in good fn i t II :: nd UpOIl r{'nsonnl,le gronnds." 
The l'ro\"ision 111:1:- ;1I'ply only wl'en trinl ... 0\111 sel was appoillted l,y the 
court, ct. Sintl' \'. ("'II:"sollt:, 2.-;,-; ,\Iinn. ;~S4, ;{!IO [()7 N.W.2,l 4.7211; 
:\{ississiPlli: ~Ii"". ('".1,' Ann. ]042 § 2;")0., rcapital cases onlyl; Xe"ada: 
XC'\". H{'\·. ~t:,t. \\.1 1;'.IIi;-;(~), 7.~(iO; Penns.yh-:l.I1ia: Penll. Stat. Anll. tit. 
]9 ~ J:.~:'.~.) Oth"r ,,1:11.·s requirl' :Ij'pointnlt'nt of e(lIlllSpl on appt'al only 
in capi1:11 I·:l~'·". (.\I:lI':llI1n: .i\ 1:1. ("o(]f' tit. 1:; ~ :P,2 (.-,) (19;);) Pocket 
Part), I appliC',l 1,"1 11 .. 1 liis('u:'s!',l in .1!,)nl .. v. Stal,.., 2.")S Ala. 6()~ f(i4 
So.2d ;)k811; Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. ~ !lfl9.2] (]!);)9 PockC't Part), 
lapplif:tl, Siaic \'x r..l. Shargaa v. Cult"f'T. 1"1:1., 11~ So.2d ~R:~l; Ueor)!ia: 
Oa, Code Ann. ~ :~; ::002 (HI-iS PO('ket Part); Illinois: TIl. He'-. Stat. 
19:39, .. 11. :11) ~ i::il:l: h:IIIS:lS: (;1'11. Stat. of Kan. ~ (i2-1~O·1 (l!l;,!) Stipp.) 
(first dpl{rec lIlll!"d,'!" only); N,·I,rasl,a: R,·v. Stat. of Xel>. 1943 
H 29-]803, :2!)·lR().! ((!l;-,!) Cum. SIIPP.); North Carolina: Gen. Stat. of 
~o, ('ar. \11.-,·].-;]; (\1;1:111"111:1: 1\"Ot'/ v. Stair, 17 Okla. Crim. 308,318-322 
[188 P. (;88]; Or"g"f'IJ: Ore. Hm'. Htat. § 1:18.420 (1959 Replacement); 
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The question calls for resolutioll ('\'('11 thou~h WI' appoint!'(l 
counsel to represent defendant in this court. The question 
('annot remain in abeyallee. This very case illustrates the 
reeurriug praetice of the Dish·iet Court of ..APlwal, S('("olld 
Distriet, Division Three, of referring the q\}('stioll or the 
appointment of COUllsr! to the local bar assoeiatiol1 (~olllmittee 
(see People v. Logan, 137 Ca1.App.2d 3:-0, 3;~2 [2~O P.2d 1] 1) 
and the consequent count('rvailill~ pradiee of this eourt to 
then grant a hearing, even 011 its OW11 mot iOIl, whenever there 
has been no appointm('nt of eounse1. There would he no 
end to sueh wasteful procedure \"ere the question deemed 
moot each time this court granted a hearing and appointed 
counsel. The question should be settled ill the interest of 
effective appellate court administration. (S('e Alnwssy v. Los 
Angeles County Civil Servicc Com., 34 ('a1.2(1 3S7, 390 [2]0 
P.2d 503]; Walling v. Mutual 'Wholesale Food 0; Supply 
Co., ]41 F.2d 331, 334-333; People ex ]"('1. lrallacc Y. La7Hcll'!, 
411 Ill. 618 []04 N.E.2d 760. 772J j Statc ex rd. Smith v. 
Smith, 197 Ore. 96 [252 P.2d 550, 563J ; 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 
772, 783, 787-793; 132 A.L.R. 1185, 1186.) 
III Griffin v. IUino-is, 351 U.S. 12 [76 S.ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 
891, 55 A.L.R..2d 1055J, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that a state may not deny to a defendant. on the 
sole ground that he cannot pay for it, a stenographic tran-
script of the trial proceedings when it is essential to effective 
appellate review. The court declared that although there is 
110 constitutional right to appeal, "that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appelJate reyiew can do so ill a WR~T 
that discriminates against some convicted defendants on ac-
count of their poverty. Appellate review has now become 
an integral part of the Illinois trial system for finally ad-
judicating the guilt or innoeence of a defendant. Conse-
quently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and 
Equal Protection claus('s pro1-ret persons like petitioners 
from invidious discriminations.~' (Id. at p. 18.) 
Although this hoIdin~ establish('s onI:v the right to a tran-
seript, it indicates the Supreme Court's concern to protect 
indigent defendants against dis('riminator~Y consequences of 
cf. Anonymous, 76 Me. 207 (1st case, 1884).) Three states refuse to 
appoint counsel on appeal. (Rhode Islana: State v. Hudson, ;.;j R.I. 141, 
153 [179 A. 130, 100 A.L.R. 313], followed. Lee Y. Kindclall, 80 RI. 212, 
217·218 [95 A.2d 51], cert. dell .. 34:) P.S. 1000 [is S.Ct. ]1-16, 9i L.Ed 
1406] ; Tennessee: State ex rel. Fi.~hel" Y. Bomar, 201 Tenn. 5i9, 581 [300 
S.W.2d 927]; Texas: Spalding Y. State, 137 Tex. ('rim. 3:29. 334 [127 
S.W.2d 457]; cf. State v. Singlc1ary, ] 87 S. C. 19, :::8 [196 S.E. 527].) 
) 
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their poverty. Denial of counsel on appeal would seem to 
be a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned 
in Griffin v. Illinois. supra. (See State v. Dfl.ancy. ~21 Ol"t~. 
620 [332 P.~d 71, 74-81]; Tile (fleet of GrifJin v. Illinois 
on the Stateli' Administration of the Criminal Law, 23 U. of 
Chi. L. Rey. 161, 170-171; Appointment of COllnscl for 111-
digent Defendants in Crimina.l Appeals, 1939 Duke L..J. 
484, 488-489.) We need not determine this constitutional 
question, however, for there are adequate independent grounds 
for the conclusion that appellate courts must appoint counsel 
on appeal for all indigent defendants convicted of felonies. 
Appointment of counsel is essential to minimize hazards 
of affirming an erroneous judgment, particularly ill view of 
rule 33 of the Rules on Appeal. This rule defines "normal 
record" on appeal and" additional record." If the defendant 
wants the record 011 appeal to indude matters that are part 
of the "additional record," he must file "with his notice 
of appeal an application describing the material which he 
desires to have included and the points on which he intends 
to rely which make it proper to include it." It is unreasonable 
to expect the average indigent defendant without counsel 
to obtain an adequate record on appeal. He would ordinarily 
be incarcerated, without access to the trial court '8 files, and 
cut off from consultation with his trial defense counsel, the 
trial judge, the prosecutor, and other witnesses to the trial. 
He would probably be without aer'ess to law book!'; and unable 
to designatc points that make it proper to include an adc1i-
tional record. lIe wonld probably bc unaware of rule 33, 
or so ullfamiliar with it that hI' '",(>111(1 fail to l'\~alizc that 
the normal record doC's not iIH'ln(lc rilling'S 011 motion~, the 
voir dire examination of .iul"ors~ the opening stat('m('nts lilHl 
arguments to the jur~', ('omm('nts 011 the evi(ll'llC'c by the 
trial jud~e, instrnetiolls given or 1"ef1ls('d, and 1"ulings on the 
admissibility of ('xhibits. lIe would Hot he all'rt, as would 
an attorlll'Y, to possihle rcv(,l'sihl(' ('ITOI'S t1)('r('in ('\,('11 whpn 
they amonnt('d to a (l('nial or ('(Illstitlltional I·i:.dlts. (S(~e 
PeOl)lc v. BmTcif. 207 ('al. 47, 4~ 1276 P. ]0031 flllHIIIl('r ill 
whit'h the tl'ial jwl~t~ ('otHllld('d th(' voir dir() ('Xalllillation 
of tilt' jurors arnol1lltl'd 10 a denial of the ("(Hlstitntiollal right 
t.o trial l,y jUI·yl.) 
EV(,11 a ('Olll't ealltlot llwl,<' an atl('qnate revi('w 011 l('ss 
than the whole 1"1'('01'(1. A Im'fiori, all aUOI'Il('Y ('alle(] npon 
by a loeal hal" asso('iatioll Hlld IIlIknowlI to dcfelHlallt or trial 
c011nsel cannot cvaluate the m(,l'its of an uppeal on 1MB than 
) 
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the whole record. It is unpredictable how far an appel1ate 
court would advance toward a determination of the merits 
of an appeal by ordering the preparation and transmission 
to it of the whole record. In any event, it would then vitiate 
rule 33, designed to avoid preparation and review of non-
essential parts of the record. 
An appellate court can no more appropriately judge 
whethcr there is error requiring reversal without the benefit 
of counsel than a trial court can decide the issues at the 
trial without benefit of counsel. (See Kopasz v. Kopa~z, 34 
Cal.2d 423, 425 [210 P.2d 846].) How then can it determine 
that there is no error requiring appointment of counsel' 
How can it undertake to dispense with counsel for indigents 
when it is not free to dispense with counsel for those who 
can afford them 1 A court does not suddenly become omni-
scient when the appellant proves impecunious. Thus in People 
v. Tahtincn, 50 Cal.2d 127 [323 P.2d 442], this court was 
divided on the merits, yet the attorney to whom the record 
was referred by the local bar association committee at the 
instigation of the District Court of Appeal thought there 
was no reasonable basis for an appeal, and that court ac-
cordingly denied defendant's request for appointment of 
counsel. In the present case that court rejected the attorney '8 
recommendation for appointment of counsel, declaring that 
the appeal was "without a semblance of merit." «Cal.App.) 
3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 205.) Yet this court, after ordering a 
hearing and appointing counsel, now finds that there are sub-
stantial legal issues demanding careful research and analysis 
that demonstrate the risk of fallibility of judgment without 
benefit of counsel's advoeacy. 
Moreover, appointment of counsel promotes effective ap-
pellate court administration. Denied counsel, defendants fre-
quently file briefs in propria persona raising issues of little 
or no merit that still require the attorney general's answer 
and the court's consideration. Often when a District Court 
of Appeal affirms the judgment, a defendant files a petition 
for hearing in this court that do€\s not comply with rules 
28 and 29, whieh presuppose an orderly presentation of the 
case before the District Court of Appeal. When a defendant 
is incapable of making sueh a presentation, this court has a 
correspondingly heavy burden in reviewing his petition. 
The court as well as defplldant is more likely to benefit 
from oral argument, as wen as from briefs presented by 
counsel rather than by defendant in propria persona. More-
) 
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over, the first alternative also ayoios possible complications of 
habeas corpus and the transportation of defendant under 
guard. There is no reason to forego these advantages of argu-
ment by counsel, particularl~' when the defendant might be 
driven to the second alternative to secure his right to oral 
argument on appeal implicit in rules 22 and 28 (f) of the 
Rules on Appeal. (Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Ad.arns, 19 
Ca1.2d 463, 467-468 [122 P.2d 257] ; see Pen. Code, § 1253; 
'Vitkin. X( II' California Rilles on Appeal, 17 So. Cal. I..J. Rev. 
232, 243-244.) 
The problem is not averted merely because Government 
Code, section 27706, makes it the duty of the public defender 
to prosecute appeals "where, in his opinion, the appeal will 
or might reasonabl~r be expected to result ill the reversal or 
modification of the judgment of conviction. " Comparable dis-
cretion vested in federal district judges is subject to appellate 
review, and counsel must be appointed to assist the defendant 
in showing that his appeal has merit. (Johnson v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 [77 S.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593] ; see also 
Eskridge v. 1l' (!.shington State BOQ1'd of Prison Terms ({; 
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 [78 S.Ct. 1061,2 L.Ed. 2d ]269] ; Farley 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 522-523 [77 8.Ct. 1371, 1 L.Ed. 
2d 1529] ; see also People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278 [140 N.E.2d 
357, 358] ; State ex reI. 'White v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572 
[34 N.E.2d 129, 131].) Moreover, it sometimes happens that 
defendants who were able to retain counsel at the trial are 
indigent at the time of appeal. It would be capricious to make 
a defendant's right to appointment of counsel on appeal de-
pend on the chance that he was represented by the public 
defender at the trial. 
In the interest, therefore, or orderl~' as well as just review 
an appellate court should appoint counsel upon the request 
of an indigent defendant cOllvicted of a felony. Any implica-
tions to the eontrary in People v, Hyde, 51 Ca1.2(1 ] 52, 1:;4 
[331 P.2d 42] ; People v. Logan, 137 Cal.App.2d 3:3], 33~-333 
[290 P.2d 11] ; People v. McGrory, 137 Cal.App.2(1 723, 724 
[291 P.2c143] ; PeOl)lc v. IIamrn, 145 Ca1.App.2rl 242, 244 i :302 
P.2d 345] ; and Pcople v. Slater, 152 Cal.App.2d 8]4, 815-816 
[313 P.20 ] 11], ~~hould he disappro\,co. 
Of course appoint0d ('ollnsel should not prC'sent frivololls 
appeals. (See Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, (;75 [78 
8.et. !)74, 2 Ij.Ed.2d lOGO], clis('llSS0d in Ehl'('nllaft, IHdirlc1l1 
Appellants £/1 the Fcrleral COIl1'is, 4G A.B.A .• J. 646,6·17; State 
ex reI. White v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 578-579 [34 N.E.2d 
) 
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129].) It is for counsel to make a reasonable investigation, 
ordinarily involving consultation with the defendant, to insure 
eonsideration of meritorious grounds of appeal. (See United 
States v. Sevilla, 174 F.2d 879, 880.) Should he then conclude 
that the appeal is frivolous, he should so advise the court and 
the defendant. He need not proceed with the appeal; should 
the defendant insist on proceeding with it, the court need not 
appoint new counsel. (People v. Tabb, 156 Cal.App.2d 467, 
471-472 [319 P.2d 656].) 
The reasons for appointment of counsel on appeal from 
judgments of conviction do not extend to habe,as corpus or 
other collateral attacks on final judgments of conviction unless 
the defendant presents a prima facie case for relief. "This 
procedural requirement does not place upon an indigent 
prisoner who seeks to raise questions of the denial of funda-
mental rights in propria persona any burden of complying 
with technicalities; it simply demands of him a measure of 
frankness in disclosing his factual situation." (In re Swain, 
34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [209 P.2d 793].) Our reluctance to con-
sider even constitutional questions on habeas corpus if they 
could have been raised on appeal (see In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 
756, 759-761 [264 P.2d 513]) makes it all the more important 
to afford defendants a fair opportunity to challenge their 
convictions on appeal. 
- Appointment of. counsel on appeal should reduce applica-
tions for post-conviction remedies in the federal courts as well 
as our own.2 As the report of July 5, 1960, of the Habeas 
Corpus Committee of the National Association of Attorneys 
General points out, the states can largely obviate review of 
their decisions in criminal cases by federal district courts on 
habeas corpus petitions by providing adequate state remedies. 
This discussion is limited to felonies because of the substa.n-
tially less serious nature of misdemeanors and their corre-
spondingly lighter penalties. (See Pen. Code, §§ 17-19b.) The 
misdemeanant suffers no loss of civil rights. (See Pen. Code, 
§§ 2600-2601.) He is entitled to bail as a matter of right after 
conviction pending appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1272.) Any incar-
ceration is likely to be brief. Frequently a misdemeanant is 
penalized only by fine, often payable in installments. (See 
Pen. Code, § 1205.) The court may grant probation summarily 
(Pen. Code, § 1203b) to the misdemeanant or permit him to 
'In the two-week period from July 25, 1960, to August 5, 1960, this 
court denied seven petitions for habeas corpus from the same prisoner, i 
who had ta.ken his appeal in propria persona.. . i 
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serve time on weekends or at times when he is not working. 
With earning capacity thus maintained he may be able to 
employ counsel. Most misdemeanants are willing to forfeit 
bailor pay the fines and find it unnecessary to employ counsel 
or request trial. There is hence not the urgency for making 
appointment of counsel on appeal for indigent misdemeanants 
mandatory instead of discretionary. 
Peters, J., and Dooling, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur only in the judgment. I am im-
pelled to point out that the discussion, in the opinion by the 
"court (ante, pp. 67-68), of purported interpretation of 
section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code by the 1953 
proposal of legislation, expression of views by an assembly 
subcommittee, and adoption of section 11503 (former § 11502, 
enacted in 1953) by the Legislature, is neither necessary nor 
appropriate. The argument concerning these matters was 
not advanced either by defendant in propria persona or by 
counsel appointed for him, but originated in this court. The 
notion that these matters which occurred in 1953 could evi-
dence what the Legislature meant ,,,hen it created the crime of 
offering to sell a contraband narcotic in 19091 appears to me 
so obviously lacking in merit as not to warrant inclusion in an 
appellate opinion; rather, such notion appears to be stated 
for no other purpose than to refute it. 
The contention made by counsel appointed for defendant 
by this court-that the word" offer" in section 11501 means 
"attempt" as defined by the law of ('J'i(HI's--is in cffect a mo!'!' 
sophisticated version of the argument advanced hy defendant 
in pro. per. before the District Court of App<'ul, Second 
District, Division Three. That court, speaking through Pre-
siding Justice Shinn (People Y. BrowlI (1960, Cal.App.), 
3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 204, 205), stated defendant's contention as 
made in pro. per. as follows: "that the word 'offer' should 
be construed to mean 'bring, bear, or carry,' and since it 
was not even shown there was a narcotic in existellee wldeh 
could have been the subj.ect of an offer, commission of the 
lBy a 1909 amendment of section S of the 1907 Poison Act the Legis· 
lature for the first time made it unlawful to "offer to sell, furnish or 
give away" narcotics except under certain couditions. (Htnts. 1 nO!), 
eh. 279, § ·1.) Since then each of the ~eries of acts which have dPIlOlInCC<l 
narcotics offenses has containe(l a provision similar to that of suell 
amended section 8 or the comparahle provision of the here pertinent 
eection ILiOI of the lIealth and Safety Code. 
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charged offense was not proved_" Without in so m11ny 
words rejecting defendant's contention as to the meanill~ 
of "otTer," the Distriet Court of Appeal correetly 1)('1(1 1 hal 
"Appellant's [defendant's] statement that he had 'it' was 
suffi('icnt as proof that the heroin was in his possession and 
that he ha<1 the ability to perform his promise." 
Now this court, after lengthy consideration of this simple 
case, eomes to the same conelusion as to the sufficiC'I1!'Y of 
the C'yidencc--the only possible conelusion under any nonmll 
theory of appellate review. The only contribution to the 
law in the opinion by the court is th(' decision that the Le~is­
lature, when it proscribed both "offers" and "attempts," 
referred to two different sorts of criminal conduct. 
In the circumstances it is obyious that the District Court 
of Appeal properly determined, on the basis of its own exami-
nation of the record, that "representation by counsel would 
be of no benefit to the appellant or to the court" and correctly 
held that "There is no merit in the appeal." (People v. 
Brown (1960, Ca1.App.), supra, 3 Ca1.Rptr. 203, 204.) 
It seems proper to note that the majority "By the Court" 
opinion states (anie, p_ 65) that "DefE'IHlant requested 
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 
Three, in which the appeal was pellding, to appoint an 
attorney to represent him, claiming that he was without funds 
to employ counsel. The court made an ino<'pendent investiga-
tion of the record, determined that representation by counsel 
would be of no benefit to defendallt or to tIle court, and denied 
the request. (See People v. Hyde, 51 Ca1.2d 152, 154 [331 
P.2d 42].) . _ . V·l e granted defendant's petition for hearing 
in this court and appointed counsel to represent him." 
It appears proper to note also that the concurring opinion 
of Mr. Justice Traynor states (ante, pp. 69-70), "I concur 
in the judgment. It is my opinion, however, that the hold-
ing in People v. Hyde, 51 Ca1.2d 152, 154 [331 P.2d 42], 
should be expanded to require the appointment of counsel on 
appeal for all indigent defendants convicted of felonies. 
"The question caUs for resolution even though we appointed 
counsel to repreRent defendant in this court. The fluestion 
cannot remain in abeyauC'C'. This very case illustrates the 
recurring practice of the District Court of Appeal, Second 
District, Division Three'. of referring the question of the 
appointment of counsel 10 the lOf'al bar aSRociation committee· 
(see People v. Logan, ]37 Cal.App.2d 331, 332 f290 P.2c1 11]) 
and the consequent counten-ailing practice of this eourt to 
) 
Dec. 1960] PEOPLE V. BROWN 77 
[55 C.2d 64; 9 Cal.Rptr. 836.357 P.2d 1072) 
then grant a hearing, even on its own motion, whenever there 
has been no appointment of counsel. There would be no end 
to such wasteful procedure were the question deemed moot 
each time this court granted a hearing and appointed counsel. 
The question should be settled in the interest of effective 
appellate court administration." 
It seems appropriate further to note that the question 
was settled by the holding in People v. Hyde (1958), 51 
Ca1.2d 152, 154 [1] [331 P.2d 42], and that the District Court 
of Appeal in the present ease complied with that holding. 
From what has been quoted above from the opinions of 
the majority and of Justice Traynor it appears proper to 
infer that the granting of a hearing in the case at bench was 
influenced at least in part by the view of the specially con-
curring justice. If such inference is properly drawn it seems 
obviously appropriate to observe that although counsel ap-
pointed by this court performed his duties faithfully and 
ably, the appointment of an attorney for the defendant has 
not aided such defendant 01' furthered the proper administra-
tion of justice. The only thing which the granting of a hear-
iug accomplished has heen a delay in final determination of 
this case and additional expense to the state. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
